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DEFEASANCE AS A RESTRICTIVE DEVICE IN MICHIGAN*
William F. Fratchert

Q

apart from any question of their validity, the imposition
of use restrictions by means of a prohibition was not practicable
before the development of equitable remedies because the common
law afforded no method of enforcing such a prohibition. One who
conveyed land in violation of a prohibition on alienation might attempt to enforce the prohibition by attacking the validity of his own
conveyance but one who violated a prohibition on use had neither
motive nor method for challenging his own acts. Hence attempts to
restrict use by common law devices are necessarily confined to penalty restraints and to limitations on the interest, as distinct from the
activities, of the user. The real covenant, as enforced at common law,
is a penalty restraint; the easement is a limitation on the interest of
the user. Defeasance by condition subsequent is a penalty restraint;
defeasance by special limitation is ordinarily a limitation on the interest of the user; defeasance by executory limitation may be both.
A condition subsequent is a provision in a conveyance, separate
from the granting clause, which empowers the conveyor to reenter
and terminate the estate conveyed upon the happening of a designated
event.1 The interest retained by the conveyor is known as a right of
entry or power of termination on condition broken.2 An example of
a conveyance upon condition subsequent is one by which Andrew
Baker conveys to John Stiles and his heirs, "Provided, that if the land
conveyed shall ever be used for the sale of intoxicating liquor, then
the said Andrew Baker and his heirs may reenter and terminate the
estate hereby conveyed." A special limitation is a provision of the
granting clause of a conveyance limiting the duration of the estate
conveyed to the period prior to the happening of a designated future
event,3 for example, a conveyance from Andrew Baker to John Stiles
UITE

"' The writer is mdebted to Professor Lewis M. Simes of the University of Michigan

Law Faculty for guidance and advice in the preparation of this article. It is closely related
to the writer's earlier articles, ''Restramts on Alienation of Legal Interests fu Michigan
Property," 50 MICH. L. Rnv. 675-736, 793-836, 1017-1046 (1952), and ''Restramts on
Alienation of Equitable Interests in Michigan Property," 51 Mrc:s:. L. Rnv. 509-552 (1953).
These articles are cited in subsequent footnotes as ''Restramts."
t Professor of Law, University of Missouri.-Ed.
11 CoKB, !NSTITaTES "'201-202 (1628).
21 SIMSs, I.Aw oF Fanmn hmmESTs 281-282 (1936); PnoPBR'l.Y R:sSTATBMENT
§24, comment b (1936). The tenn "power of tennination," used by the Restatement, is
not a happy one because the old law made a shatp distinction between a condition subsequent, which was permissible in a common law conveyance, and a power of revocation,
which could be used only in a conveyance operating under the Statute of Uses. 1 CoKB,
INsnnrrns 237a (1628).
3 GRAY, RtILE AGAINST l'ERPETOI'l'IES, 3d ed., §32 (1915); PROP.BR'l.Y R:sSTATBMENT
§23 (1936).
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and his heirs "so long as the said land shall not be used for the sale
of intoxicating liquor," or, "until the said land is used for the sale of
intoxicating liquor." If the conveyance is in fee simple, the interest
retained by the conveyor is Imown as a possibility of reverter.4 An
exec~tory limitation is usually one which creates a shifting use or
shiftfug executory devise, both of which interests are commonly Imown
as executory interests. A shifting use is created by a conditional limita- .
tion, that is, a provision in a conveyance operating under the Statute
of Uses that, upon the happening of a designated future event, the
use shall shift from the immediate conveyee to another.5 For example, a conveyance from Andrew Baker to James Thorpe and his
heirs to the use of John Stiles and his heirs ''but if the said land shall
be used for the sale of intoxicating liquor, then to the use of Roger
White and his heirs." A shifting executory devise is created by a
similar provision in a will. 6 Rights of entry on condition broken,
possibilities of reverter and executory interests were, under the older
law, heritable but not alienable.7 The rule of inalienability has been
relaxed to some extent in modem law8 but these interests are still personal in the sense that they are not appurtenant to other land.
The condition subsequent was the £rst of these devices to be developed. and, consequently, the authorities as to its possibilities are
more complete than those as to the other three. In the thirteenth
century the condition su'f?sequent was a common device for enforcing
the payment of money. The common law mortgage took the form
of a conveyance by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, in fee or of some
lesser estate, upon condition that if the mortgagor should repay the
mortgage debt, he or his heirs might reenter and terminate the estate
of the mortgagee.9 Similarly a ·conveyance in fee simple reserving a

-a-

4 l Su.ms, I.Aw OF FOTIJltB INTERESTS 24 (1936); PitoPER'lY R:ssrATBl\U!Nr §23,
illus. 4 (1936). Professor Gray and some other writers have thought that the statute
Quia Emptores Terram,n [18 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1290)] precludes the existence of such
an interest after a fee simple but posSI"bilities of reverter have been recognized by the
courts. See GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPnTtllTills §§31-37; CB:ALLis, I.Aw OF RnAr. PROP·
ER'lY, 3d ed., 437-439 (1911); Powell, ''Determinable Fees," 23 CoL, L. Rnv. 207-234
(1923); Vance, "Rights of Reverter and the Statute Quia Emptores," 36 YALU L.J. 593607 (1927); Hopper v. Corporation of Liverpool, 88 SoL. J. 213 (Lanes. Ch. 1944), noted,
62 L.Q. Rnv. 222 (1946).
51 Sll'.Dls, I.Aw oF Ftl'TIDlE INnllESTs 269 (1936). Professor Gray and others refer
to the interest itself as a conditional limitation. GRAY, ROI.E AGAml'fr P.BRPETOITmS §32.
The Restatement of Property denominates it an executocy limitation. Sec. 25 (1936).
6 Note 5 supra.
71 CoKE, lNSnTaTBs *214a (1628); ''Restraints," 50 M:mn. L. Rnv. 827, note 359
(1952).
s ''Restraints," 50 MICR. L. R:sv. 827, 829, 830, notes 359, 371, 374 (1952).
91.rrr.u;.ToN, TENtIIms §332 (1481).
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rent charge might provide that, if the rent was in default, the conveyor might reenter and terminate the estate conveyed.10 A provision in a lease for life or years for forfeiture on non-payment of rent
then was, and still is, common. It will be observed that such conditions
designed to enforce the payment of money do not in any way regulate the enjoyment or restrict the use of the land conveyed.

Restrictions on Legal Estates of Inheritance

As in the case of direct restraints on alienation, attempts were made
in the mediaeval period to impose restrictions on the use of land by
means of conditions subsequent. Conditions subsequent in general
restraint of alienation in conveyances in fee simple were early held to
be invalid upon two grounds, (l) that the statute Quia Emptores T erraru,m prohibited the retention of a reversion after a fee simple, and
(2) that such a condition restrained the exercise of an essential incident
of an estate in fee simple and so was repugnant to the grant.11 Attempts to impose use restrictions on land incident to a conveyance in
fee simple, by means of conditions subsequent, met a similar analysis
by the courts and the same fate. A condition in such a conveyance
that the conveyee should not take the pro.6.ts,12 cut trees1 3 or commit
waste14 was void and the conveyee took an indefeasible estate.15 LikelOid., §325.
§360. "Restraints," 50 Mxar. L. Ibrv. 701, 702, 703, notes 108, II5, 121, 122
(1952).
.
12Fitz-Hugh v. Comewall, Y.B. 7 Hen. VI, Trln., pl. 21 (Exch. Ch. 1429); Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VII, Trln., pl. 15 (1506); Puseto's Case, Y.B. 21 Hen. VII, Mich.,
pl. IO (1506); 1 Co:im, lNSTrrOTBs *206b (1628); P.aBXINs, PROPITAJ3LB Boox:s §731
(1642); SHBPPAIU>, TonCHSToNE oF Cor.:cru:oN AsstmANCES 131 (1648). See EylifE v.
Chopley, 1 Bulst. 42, 80 Eng. Rep. 746 (1610); Sir Edward Coke's Case, Godbolt 289, 78
Eng. Rep. 169 at 175 (1623). So, iE land is devised in fee simple or personalty bequeathed
11Id.,

absolutely, a provjso that the devisee or legatee shall not enjoy the property until he :reaches
a stipulated age is void. EylifE v. Chopley, supm; Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, 49
Eng. Rep. 282 (1841), affd. 1 Cr. & Ph. 240, 41 Eng. Rep. 482 (1841); Gosling v.
Gosling, Joh. 265, 70 Eng. Rep. 423 (1859); Harbin v. Masterman, [1894] 2 Ch. 184,
affd., sub nom. Wharton v. Masterman, [1895] AC. 186.
13 See Earl of Pembroke's Case, Jenk. 266, pl. 73, note, 145 Eng. Rep. 191 (1597);
Stukeley v. Butler, Hobart 168, 80 Eng. Rep. 316 (1614).
14 SHBPPAIU>, TonCHSTONE oP CoMMON AsstntANCEs 131 (1648); P.BIUaNs, PROFITAJ3LB Boo:im §731 (1642). See Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21, BRoo:im,
GRAUNDB AimmcBMBNT, "Conditions," pl. 57 (1442). Cf. Earl of Pembroke's Case, Jenk.
266, pl. 73, note, 145 Eng. Rep. 191 (1597); Sir Anthony Milclmay's Case, 6 Co. Rep.
40a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311 at 314 (1605); Mary Portington's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 35b, 77 Eng.
Rep. 976 at 982 (1613); Jervis v. Bruton, 2 Vernon 251, 23 Eng. Rep. 762 (1691); Turner
v. Wright, 2 DeG., F. & J. 234, 45 Eng. Rep. 612 (1860). As the statute Quia Emptcres
Terrarum did not apply to the sovereign it would seem that the Crown can convey in fee
simple subject to a valid condition :requiring the tenant to keep the premises in :repair. See
Flower v. Hartopp, 6 Beav. 476, 49 Eng. Rep. 910 (1843). Cf. 1 Co:im, lNSTrrOTBS
*223a (1628).
151 Co:im, lNsnnm!s *206b (1628). See Fitz-Hugh v. Comewall, Y.B. 7 Hen. VI,
Trin., pl. 21 (1429).
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wise, a condition in an otherwise absolute conveyance of standing timber, that it be removed within a stipulated period, was invalid.16
The sum of the old decisions makes it clear that the condition subsequent could not be used as a device for imposing use restrictions on
a fee simple in private ownership. It should not be usable for that
purpose in modem law.17 Such a condition violates the principles
of the fixed scheme of estates established in the thirteenth century
by depriving the gr~atest estate lmown to the law, the fee simple, of
essential incidents. It is also wrong in principle and objectionable in
practice for other reasons. There can be no social justification for restricting the development and use of land by its possessor except for
the protection of the community, the owner of another estate in the
same land, or the owner of other land in the vicinity. Community
protection is a function of government. Since the enactment of Quia
Emptores Terrarum, one who conveys in fee simple cannot retain
an estate in the land conveyed. Even if the conveyor does own other
land in the vicinity which would be benefited by the restriction, the
condition subsequent is not a proper or effective device for protecting
other land because it is not and cannot be made appurtenant to the
benefited land.18 As has been seen, the right of entry on breach of
condition is personal to the conveyor and, under the older law, not only
did not pass with a conveyance of the benefited land but could not be
conveyed to a purchaser of the benefited land. Moreover, if a conveyor
can restrict the use of land conveyed in fee simple by means of a
condition subsequent, for the benefit of land which he retains, the condition would operate as an indirect restraint on alienation of the retained land also because that land would not be as valuable in the
hands of a purchaser who could not enforce the condition as it was in
the hands of the owner of the right of entry.
Another feature of the condition subsequent which makes it inappropriate as a device for imposing restrictions on the use of land held
in fee simple is that, so soon as it is enforced, it ceases to restrict. For
example, if Andrew Baker may convey land to John Stiles and his heirs
upon an effective conditio_n that intoxicating liquors not be sold on the
premises, a breach of the condition followed by entry by the heir of
Andrew will destroy the condition itself as well as the estate of John.
The heir of Andrew will be free to use the land as the site of a saloon;
indeed, his purpose in entering may be to take advantage of the fact
that the land is now valuable chiefly for that purpose. TJ:ms the con10 Stukeley v. Butler, Hobart 168, 80 Eng. Rep. 316 (1614).
17 Cm!sBIRB, Mo»BBN I.Aw OP REAL PnoPBRfi, 6th ed., 522-523 (1949).
1s3 WALSH, CoM:MBN'rARIBS oN nm LA.w oP REAL PRoPBRn 39-40 (1947).
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dition is worthless for the protection of the community or of neighboring land unless the holder of the right of entry happens to own land
in the vicinity, the likelihood of which eventuality is reduced by the
personal, non-appurtenant character of rights of entry.
Perhaps the most seriously objectionable feature of the condition
subsequent as a device for imposing use restrictions is that the right of
entry is a legal property interest which is not cut off or affected by
change of circumstances. Courts of equity will not grant specific performance of real covenants restricting use or enforce equitable servitudes after the purpose of the restriction has ceased or change in the
character of the neighborhood has made enforcement inequitable. Conditions subsequent require no equitable remedy for enforcement; indeed, if the holder of the right of entry can exercise it peaceably, theyrequire no judicial enforcement at all. Hence they may be enforced
after changes in the neighborhood have made the enforcement of the
restriction absurd by a holder of a right of entry who has no intention
of confining his use to that permitted by the condition. This being so,
the condition subsequent has much more tendency to prevent the
development and use of land in the manner most suitable under current economic and social conditions than have the real covenant and
the equitable servitude.19 _
The rule of nullity of conditions in general restraint of alienation
of estates in fee simple had an exception in the case of restraints on
types of alienation which would be wrongful apart from the condition.20 Thus, as a public or charitable corporation has no legal right
to alienate lands conveyed to it for public or charitable purposes,21 a
condition against alienation in a conveyance to such a corporation is
valid.22 The same principle is applicable to use restrictions. As a
public or charitable corporation or the trustee of a charitable trust may
not rightfully use lands for other than the public or charitable purpose for which they are conveyed to it or him, a condition restricting
the land to such uses does not deprive the estate conveyed of any
incident which it would otherwise have. Even so, the enforcement
of such a condition in a conveyance in fee simple seems, on :first examination, to violate the rule laid down by the statute Quia Emptores
10 Id. at 40-44. There are, however, a vezy few decisions refusing to enforce conditions subsequent because of changed circumstances. Goldstein, ''Rights of Entry and
Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land," 54 HARv. L. REv. 248 at
266-275 (1940).
20 Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28, BnooKB, GRAUND:E .AnRIDGEMEN'l',
"Conditions," pl. 239 (1494); "Restraints," 50 MICH. L. REv. 701, 731 (1952).
21 ''Restraints," 50 MICH. L. REv. 731, note 219 (1952).
22 ''Restraints," 50 MICH. L. REv. 732, note 222 (1952).
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T errarum that there cannot be a reversion expectant upon a fee simple.
As has been seen, however, that rule does not prevent conditions subsequent designed to secure the payment of money or some other benefit to the conveyor collateral to and not touching or conceming the
land conveyed; It is arguable that the founder of a charity has a benefit
from the continued operation of the charity quite distinct from any
retained interest in the land conveyed.28 Moreover, as the real beneficiaries of a charitable disposition of property are an indefinite group
of unascertained and unbom persons, their interest is contingent in
some sense. It has long been settled that one who conveys land upon
contingent uses retains a reversion by way of resulting use so long as
the uses remain contingent.24 It is, perhaps, for this reason that, when
the specific charitable purpose of a trust becomes impossible of accomplishment and no general charitable intent is present, there is a resulting trust for the settlor.25 Thus, upon further examination, it
appears that charitable dispositions do differ, for purposes of the problem at hand, from ordinary conveyances in fee simple to private
persons. In any event, it would seem that a condition subsequent in
an otherwise absolute transfer for public or charitable purposes, designed to restrict the use of the property transferred to the designated
purposes, is valid.26 This exception to the general rule that conditions subsequent may not be used to impose use restrictions on land
held in fee simple has been greatly limited by modem English
decisions that, even in a conveyance to a charity, a condition subsequent
is void unless the event which will entitle the conveyor to enter must
happen, if at all, within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.27
It appearing, then, that the law of England does not permit the
use of defeasance by condition subsequent in a conveyance in fee
23 That

the early cases permitted the heir of the settlor of a charitable trust to sue in

equity to enforce the trust is indicative of this. 1 Cal. Proc. Ch. 56 (1456).
24 Plunket v. Holmes, Raym. Sir T. 28, 83 Eng. Rep. 15 (1661); Purefoy v. Rogers,
2 Wms. Saund. 380, 85 Eng. Rep. 1181 (1671); Carter v. Bamadiston, 1 P. Wms. 505,
24 Eng. Rep. 492 (1718). See Lodington v. Kime, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 183, 21 Eng. Rep.
974 (1697); 1 FE.ulN:B, CoNTJNGm.T REMAINDERS, 10th ed., 360-364 (1844); 1 SIMES,
I.Aw OF FtJTaRB lNTBru!STS §45 (1936); Pratcher, ''Trustor as Sole Trustee and Only
Ascertainable Beneficiary," 47 MICH. L. REv. 907 at 925-926 (1949),
25 In re British Red Cross Balkan Fund, [1914] 2 Ch. 419; In re Stanford, [1924]
l'Ch. 73.
20 Walsh v. Secretary of State for India, IO H.L.C. 367 (1863); Re Robinson, [1897]
1 Ch. 85 (C.A.); Re Macnamara, 104 L.T.·771 (1911). Cf. Attorney-General v. Pyle, 1
Atk. 435, 26 Eng. Rep. 278 (1738); In re Randell, 38 Ch. D. 213 (1888); In re Blunt's
Trusts, [1904] 2 Ch. 767.
27Jn re Trustees of Hollis' Hospital, [1899] 2 Ch. 540; In re Da Costa, [1912] I Ch.
337; Re Peel's Release, [1921] 2 Ch. 218. See In re Macleay, L.R. 20 Eq. 186 at 190
(1875); Dunn v. Flood, 25 Ch. D. 629 at 633 (1882), affd., 28 Ch. D. 586 at 592 (1885).
American cases c01itra are collected in GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PBRPETUrl".CES, 3d ed., 288·
298 (1915) and 3 Sco:rr, LAw OF TRUSTS 2127 (1939).
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simple to a private person, as a device for imposing use restrictions,
what of defeasance by special limitation or executory limitation? Sir
Edward Cok<:! appears to have thought that the same rules which
governed the validity of conditions subsequent applied to special
limitations, and he probably thought that they also applied to executory
limitations.28 Mr. Charles Fearne, the leading authority on executory
limitations, clearly was of the opinion that, whenever a condition
subsequent would be repugnant to the estate granted, a limitation
imposing the same restriction would be.29 Indeed, this conclusion is
logically necessary from the premises upon which the decisions concerning conditions subsequent are based. The objection to a condition
subsequent against alienation, use or waste is not to the form of the
penalty but to the fact that any penalty upon the exercise of an essential
incident of the estate conveyed operates to make that estate one which
the law will not allow.
Grave doubt as to the validity of special limitations30 and a judicial
tendency to construe language as something other than a special limitation have deprived us of English precedents as to the efficacy of that
device for imposing use restrictions. Two modem English equity
decisions offer some slight suggestion that an executory limitation
might be effective where a condition subsequent would not. In one
it was held that, where land was devised in fee with an executory
devise over to another if the first devisee died without a surviving
issue, the first devisee would be prevented by injunction from committing "equitable waste," that is, injuries to the premises which a
prudent owner in fee simple absolute would not inflict, such as
destroying the principal buildings or cutting immature trees.31 In the
other case, land was devised in fee with an executory devise to another
if the first devisee died without surviving male issue and a further
provision that if the first devisee should not occupy the land or should
fell timber or plough any orchard, meadow or pasture, the land would
pass to the same executory devisee. The first devisee cut timber and
28 ! Co:im, !NSTITOTEs "'20la, "'20lb (1628); I Sn.ms, I.Aw oP FtITtnm IN:rmu!STS
285-286 (1936). Accord, SBEPPAllD, TouCHSToNE OP CoMMoN AssmtANCES 133 (1648).
20 I F.BARNB, CoNTING'EN'l.' REr.rAINDERS AND Ex:Ectr:rORY DEVISES, 5th ed., "'384
(1795): "We ar.; further to observe, that there are certain incidents and qualities so
annexed. to and inherent in certain estates, as to be incapable 0£ being restrained or prohibited by any proviso, condition or limitation; and therefore, where an estate is limited to
take effect upon any such restrictive condition annexed to a preceding estate, such limitation
is held to be void and incapable 0£ taking effect at all. I shall instance this in the case 0£
an estate-tail; to which the power 0£ suffering a common recovery, and 0£ levying a fine •••
is so incident and adherent, that any condition or proviso restraining or prohibiting it, is
held to be repugnant to the nature 0£ the estate, and therefore void."
ao Note 4 supra.
a1 Turner v. Wright, 2 DeG., F., & J. 234, 45 Eng. Rep. 612 (1860).
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died without surviving male issue. It was held that his estate was
liable to the executory devisee for the value of the timber.32 Neither
decision amounted to enforcement of an executory limitation conditioned upon the commission of waste but both cases seem inconsistent
with the ancient rule that the privilege of committing waste is an
essential incident of an estate of inheritance.
As has been seen, in England a right of entry on breach of condition is void unless the event which is to give rise to the right must
occur within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.33 Both in
England and here an executory limitation is void unless the event upon
which it is conditioned must occur within the period of the rule.84
The validity of possibilities of reverter expectant upon the expiration of
estates on special limitation is, however, probably unaffected by the
Rule Against Perpetuities.35 The invalidity of a condition subsequent
or an executory limitation does not affect the validity of the estate
conveyed subject thereto and, indeed, makes that estate indefeasible.
If a special limitation is invalid it would ·seem that the same result
should be reached.36
Although no form of defeasance, even if valid, is a desirable or
appropriate method of imposing use restrictions on estates in fee
simple, the executory limitation is the least objectionable of the three
types of defeasance. Being subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities,
it cannot be perpetual. Moreover, an executory limitation can be made
appurtenant to neighboring land in a sense. For example, Andrew
Baker might convey Blackacre to James Thorpe and his heirs to the
use of John Stiles and his heirs, "but if, within twenty-one years after
the death of the survivor of the descendants of Oliva Dionne now
living, Blackacre shall be used for the sale of intoxicating liquor, then
to the use of the then owner of Whiteacre and his heirs."
As to estates in fee tail, any proviso, condition or limitation tending
J.

32 Blake v. Peters, 1 DeG.,
& S. 345, 46 Eng. Rep. 139 (1863).
33 Note 27 supra.
34GRAY, Rur.n AGAINST PERPE-rorrms, 3d ed., §317 (1915); 2

Sn.ms, Lt..w oi,
Fonnm hr.rmmsTs 363 (1936).
35 In re Chardon, [1928] 1 Ch. 464; GRAY, Rur.n AGAINST P.ERPErorrms, 3d ed.,
§312 (1915); C!msHIRE, MoDERN LA.w oit REAL PROPERTY, 6th ed., 520 (1949). Contra,
Hopper v. Corporation of Liverpool, 88 Sol. J. 213 (Lanes. Ch. 1944), noted, 62 L.Q.
R:av. 222 (1946). See Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective," 65 HARv. L. R:av. 721 at
740 (1952). The conveyance involved in the Hopper case limited land to trustees for a
private librai:y society so long as a building thereon was used for the pmposes of the society.
If the thesis of this article is sound, the language of special limitation might well have been
held invalid for repugnancy as well as for violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
36 PROPERTY R:asTAT.EMElllT §228, comment a (1936). But see In re Moore, 39 Ch.
D. 116 (1888); CHBsHIRE, MoDERN LA.w oit REAL PROPERTY, 6th ed., 521 (1949);
Browder, "Illegal Conditions and Limitations: Effect of Illegality," 47 MICH, L. R:av. 759
at 773 (1949).

1954]

DEFEASANCE As A REsTRicTIV:E DEVICE

513

to impair or penalize the right of the tenant in tail to suffer a common
recovery or levy a statutory fine was void.37 The old cases make it
equally clear that any such provision penalizing the tenant in tail for
using the land38 or committing waste was likewise void.89 Moreover,
by suffering a common recovery, the tenant in tail. cut off not only
the interests of the heirs in tail and the reversion or remainder following the estate but also all conditions and executory limitations to
which it was subject.40 This being so, there could be no practically
effective provision for defeasance in a conveyance in fee tail.
The early American cases showed a disposition to follow the
English precedents. In Ne:wkerk-v. Ne:ivkerk41 the New York Supreme
Court refused to enforce a condition subsequent annexed to a devise
in fee, requiring the devisees to reside in the village where the land
Jay, on the ground that it was repugnant. In Hayden -v. Inhabitants
of Stoughton42 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts enforced
a condition subsequent annexed to a devise in fee to a town, requiring
use of the land for a public school, without mention of the Rule
Against Perpetuities. Then that court, seemingly without realizing
it, made a major departure from the principles of the common law
which has diverted the whole course of American development. In
Gray -v. Blanchard43 the plaintiff, who owned no other land in the
vicinity, conveyed a house and lot in fee simple, subject to a condition against placing windows in the north wall of the house within
thirty years. The condition was breached and the plaintiff was
allowed to recover the land, the court saying,
"It is next argued, that this condition is void, as being repugnant to the grant, restraining the beneficial use of the estate.
R:sv. 691, note 76 (1952).
op CoMMON AssuRANcBS 131 (1648). See Fitz-Hugh
v. Comewall, Y.B. 7 Hen. VI, Trln., pl. 21 (Exch. Ch. 1429); Sir Edward Coke's Case,
Godbolt 289, 78 Eng. Rep. 169 at 175 (1623).
39 SEBPPAIU>, TouCBSTONB oP Cor.u.toN AsstmANCEs 131 (1648). See Earl of Pembroke's Case, Jenk. 266, pl. 73, note, 145 Eng. Rep. 191 (1597); Sir Anthony l\fildmay's
Case, 6 Co. Rep. 40a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311 at 314 (1605); Mary Portington's Case, IO Co.
Rep. 35b, 77 Eng. Rep. 976 at 982 (1613). Cf. Stukeley v. Butler, Hobart 168, 80 Eng.
Rep. 316 (1614); Jervis v. Bruton, 2 Vernon 251, 23 Eng. Rep. 762 (1691).
40 Gulliver ex dem. Corrie v. Ashby, 4 Burr. 1929, 98 Eng. Rep. 4 (1766); 2 FEAmra,
CoNTJNGBNT R:s:MAINDERS AND ExECUTORY DEVIslls 107 (Powell's note to 4th ed. 1795):
"But it is established beyond dispute at this day, that all collateral and conditional limitations, and provisoes annexed to an estate tail, may be 'barred 'by a coIDlllon recovery of
tenant in tail, suffered before the condition or event happens, in which the proviso or conditional limitation is to take effect."
412 Caine (N.Y.) 345 (1805).
42 5 Pick. (22 Mass.) 528 (1827). The argument of counsel for plaintiff (p. 530)
indicates that he considered the condition valid only because the devise was to a public
coi:poration for charitable pmposes.
43 8 Pick. (25 Mass.) 284 (1829). Criticized, Loring, "Estates Upon Condition,'' 1
&t. L. R:av. 265 at 266 (1867).
37 ''Restraints," 50 :MrCR. L.
38 SEBPPAm>, TouCBSTONB
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Without doubt, conditions of the nature supposed are void, and
the estate is absolute; but the law very clearly defines this rule,
and the cases cited to support this position show the limitations
and exceptions to the rule.
"A lease for two years, provided the lessee occupy but one;
this is repugnant and senseless, and the proviso shall be rejected.
Scovell 11. Cabell, Cro. Eliz. 107.44
"Grant of a house upon condition not to meddle with the
shops, the shops being part of the house; this is of the same
nature. Hob. 170.45
"So a grant of land or rents in fee simple, upon condition that
the grantee shall not alien, or that his widow shall not have dower;
these conditions are void, as clearly repugnant to the grant; Shep.
Touch. 129, 131; for it is of the essence of a fee simple estate,
that it shall be alienable and subject to dower.
"But if the condition be that the grantee shall not alien to
particular persons, or within a reasonable limited period, these
conditions shall stand, not being inconsistent with the nature of
the estate granted. Co. Lit. 223.
·
"If one make a feoffment in fee on condition that the feoffee
shall retain the land for twenty years without interruption, it
seems this is a good condition and not repugnant. Shep. Touch.
131.46 A feoffment in fee with a condition that the feoffee shall
not enjoy the land or take the profits, or that his heirs shall not
inherit it, or that the feoffee shall do no waste, or that his wife
shall not be endowed; these are all repugnant and void. Shep.
Touch. 131. And the same law is of a grant by deed of bargain
and sale, for by our law this is an entire substitute for a feoffment.
"But partial and temporary restrictions as to the use, may
be consistent with the estate granted, and so may stand.
"A condition in a deed of a house, that there shall be no
windows in it, or no passage in and out, or that the grantee
should never occupy or sell it, would come within the rule and
be void; but that there should be no door or window on one side
or end, that it should not be sold for several years; or to a parEliz. 89, pl. 13, 107, pl. l, 78 Eng. Rep. 347 at 365 (1589).
Butler, Hobart 168, 80 Eng. Rep. 316 at 317 (1614) (dictum).
46 Sheppard's language is, ''If one make a feoffment of land in fee, on condition that
the feoffor shall retain the land for twenty years without interruption; it seems this is a
good condition and not repugnant." This passage is based on Anonymous, 3 Dyer 318b,
73 Eng. Rep. 721 (1572), which seems to have involved a clumsy attempt to convey a
springing use to commence twenty years after the date of the deed. By changing "feoffor"
to "feoffee" in paraphrasing the passage, the Massachusetts court wholly changed its mean·
ing and made it appear to support the validity of a condition subsequent requiring a grantee
in fee simple to occupy the land or refrain from alienating his estate.
44 Cro.

45 Stukeley v.
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ticular person, would fall within the exception to the rule, and
form a valid condition."47
The unsoundness of the court's language as to limited restraints
on alienation of estates in fee simple has previously been demonstrated.48 The inconsistency of its decision with the old rules that
a tenant in fee may not be restrained by condition from cutting trees
or committing waste is apparent. Nevertheless, Gray 17. Blanchard
was followed in a number of American decisions49 until, by 1879, the
United States Supreme Court could say:
"Repugnant conditions are those which tend to the utter subversion of the estate, such as prohibit entirely the alienation or
use of the property. Conditions which prohibit its alienation to
particular persons or for a limited period, or its subjection to
particular uses, are not subversive of the estate: they do not destroy
or limit its alienable or inheritable character. Sheppard's Touchstone, 129, 131. The reports are full of cases where conditions
imposing restrictions upon the uses to which property conveyed
in fee may be subjected have been upheld. In this way slaughterhouses, soap-factories, distilleries, livery-stables, tanneries, and
machine-shops have, in a multitude of instances, been excluded
from particular localities, which, thus freed from unpleasant
sights, noxious vapors, or disturbing noises, have become desirable
as places for residences of families." 50
In following the decision in Gray 17. Blanchard that conditions
subsequent restricting use are not ?=epugnant to estates in fee simple,
American courts have usually overlooked the suggestion in the opinion
in that case that such conditions are valid only when the restrictions
are temporary. In the absence of express statutes limiting their duration, the courts here have tended to treat such conditions as valid even
47 8

Pick. (25 Mass.) 284 at 289-290 (1829).

48 "Restraints," 50 MICIL L. lbw. 702-705 (1952).
49 E.g., Speny's Lessee v. Pond, 5 Ohio 387 (1832)

(probably a .special limitation);
Lawrence v. Gilford, 17 Pick. (34 Mass.) 366 (1835); Plumb v. Tubbs, 41 N.Y. 442
(1869); O'Brien v. Wetherell, 14 Kan. 616 (1875); Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U.S.
55 (1879). See Gillis v. Bailey, 17 N.H. 18 (1845); Craig v. Wells, 11 N.Y. 315 at 322
(1854); Nicoll v. New York and Erie R.R. Co., 12 N.Y. 121 (1854); Collins l\1fg. Co.
v. Marcy, 25 Conn. 242 (1855); Warner v. Bennett, 31 Conn. 468 (1863); Gibert v.
Peteler, 38 N.Y. 165 (1868).
60 Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U.S. 55 at 57 (1879). The only cases cited in support
of these broad assertions are Plumb v. Tubbs, and O'Brien v. Wetherell, note 49 supra,
which involved conditions against sale of liquor, Gray v. Blanchard, note 43 supra, and
Doe ex: dem. Bish v. Keeling, I M. & S. 95, 105 Eng. Rep. 36 (1813), which involved
a condition in a lease for years and so is not in point. Later American cases enforcing
conditions subsequent imposing use restrictions on estates in fee simple are collected in
Goldstein, "Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of
Land," 54 HARv. L. lbw. 248 (1940); Williams, ''Restrictions on the Use of Land; Conditions Subsequent and Determinable Fees," 27 TEX. L. lbw. 158 (1948).
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though the restrictions imposed are perpetual.51 Such a conclusion
assumes that rights of entry on condition broken are not subject to the
Rule Against Perpetuities. Apparently the theory upon which they
have been excepted from the operation of the rule in this country
is that they are reversionary interests. This theory is unsound in any
jurisdiction where the statute Quia Emptores T errarum is in force
because that statute prohibits the retention of a reversionary interest
expectant upon a fee simple. Moreover, with rare exceptions, American
courts have held conditions subsequent enforceable even though
change of conditions has made continuation of the prescribed use
worthless to the owner of the right of entry and to the owners of
neighboring land.52 The decisions are too few to warrant generalization
as to the American view of the validity of special limitations and
executory limitations as devices for the imposition of use restrictions,53
except to note that executory limitations are subject to the Rule Against
Perpetuities.54
Probably the American divergence from the salutary principles
of the ancient common law is due in part to lack of understanding of
the old law. Coke and Blackstone, the authorities most accessible
here, devoted less attention to the application of the doctrine of
repugnancy to conditions and limitations restricting use than to its
application to direct restraints on alienation. The old reporters were
hard to find and hard to read. As an American writer has aptly
observed,
"Much of modem repugnance to reading the old reporters
arises, no doubt, from the huge volumes in which they are incarcerated, from the hirsute aspect of a Gothic letter, and the other
inconunodities of an exploded mechanism. If these venerable
authors were dressed more in the fashion, and made to look like
ourselves, we should feel less awe in taking them by the hand, and
.in asking their advice. Indeed, if there were more persons to perform the labors so acceptably discharged by the editors of Yelverton, and Latch, and Hobart, it is not easy to believe the profession
would groan, as it does, under the intolerable burden with which,
by modem reporters, we are grieved and wearied. We should not
be made to read, in hundreds of new volumes, the re-decisions of
51 Note 27 supra; PROPERTY RBSTAT.EMBNT §370, comment e; §372, comment a
(1944).
52 Goldstein, "Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrlct the
Use of Land," 54 HA:a.v. L. RBv. 248 at 266-275 (1940).
53 The opinion in Spercy's Lessee v. Pond, 5 Ohio 387 (1832), indicates that a 5Pecial
limitation may be used where a condition subsequent could be.
54 Note 34 supra; PROPERTY RBsrATEMl!NT §370, comment h; §372, comment a
(1944).
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questions perfectly settled by the generations before us. By communicating more closely with these spirits of the great departed,
we should form more modest estimate of our own times; and, in
the conviction that the intelligence and labors of the dead are as
sterling as those of the living, should find restraint to that disregard of authority which, in some of our States, has become the
bane of their jurisprudence."65
No doubt the American divergence from the wisdom of the old
common law is to some extent deliberate. The growth of industrial
cities without public community planning gave rise to a legitimate
demand for some method of creating residential districts protected
against the invasion of obnoxious industries and businesses. Until
the English courts, in the middle of the nineteenth century, invented
the much more suitable device of the equitable servitude,66 lawyers
thought of defeasance as one of the few methods known to the law
which might possibly serve the purpose. So, despite the grave deficencies and serious evils of defeasance as a device for imposing use
restrictions, its use for the purpose was tolerated.
.
There has also been a negative objection to the old rules. They
were expressed in terms of the doctrine of repugnancy, which had two
aspects.67 One aspect was only the obviously necessary rule that when
a conveyance contains two mutually inconsistent provisions, both
cannot stand. Thus if Andrew Balcer leases land to John Stiles "for ten
years, provided that the duration of this lease shall not exceed five
years," the clauses are inconsistent and one or the other must be
rejected. This aspect of the repugnancy doctrine involved merely rules
of construction and does not affect the problem at hand. The other
aspect of the repugnancy doctrine involved substantive law. At the
beginning of the thirteenth century the types and incidents of permissible estates in land had not been fixed and it seemed possible to
create an estate of any duration and with any incidents which the
ingenuity of man might conceive. During that century the courts
set themselves to limiting the permissible interests in land to a definite
list of estates, each with fixed and inseparable incidents.58 A necessary
consequence of this development was a rule that provisions in a conveyance tending to deprive the estate granted of essential incidents
were void as repugnant to the grant.is9 The thirteenth century concept
liGWALLAc:e, TBB RBPORTEBS, 4th ed., 228, note (1882).
G6Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848); JOLLY, RBsnuCTIVB
CoVENANTS AI'PECTING LAND, 2d ed., 1 (1931).
572 SIMEs, I.Aw oit Fonnm !NrERESTs §323 (1936).
GS "Restraints," 50 MICH. L. RBv. 700, note 102 (1952).
59 "Restraints," 50 M!CR. L. RBv. 700, note 103 (1952).
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of restricting the permissible types of interests in land to a fixed list
of estates with invariable incidents was not congenial to persons imbued with nineteenth century views on liberty of contract. To such
persons it seemed desirable, above all things, to carry out the intention
of testator or grantor, whether· or not it coincided with the ancient
scheme of estates, at least unless that intention conflicted with "public
policy." So the doctrine of repugnancy has been subjected to attack.60
There is a basic weakness· in much of the nineteenth century
advocacy of liberty of contract. It was often founded on the fallacious
assumption that all objectionable restraints on liberty are imposed by
the state or an established church; that if private persons are only let
alone by state and church they will be truly free and will not restrict
each other's liberty objectionably. The disillusionment which has·come
upon the holders of this optimistic assumption has been mentioned
in another connection.61 Unquestionably the most seriously evil restrictions upon liberty to alienate, develop and use land have been
imposed by private rather than state action.62 The belief of the thirteenth century judges that the law ought, by fixed and certain rules,
to restrict the liberty of private persons to impose restrictions on the
alienation and use of land by others, had a s~und foundation in the
facts of human character and experience.63 It conceived of liberty in
a broader sense than did some of the proponents of laissez fa ire and
sought to use the machinery of the law to protect that broader liberty.
The Supreme Court of Michigan intimated, before the enactment
of the Revised Statutes of 1846, that a condition subsequent in a conveyance in fee simple, requiring the grantee to indemnify the grantor
against debts secured by mortgage on the land conveyed, was valid,
although the forfeiture could not be enforced in equity.64 That condition was, of course, of a type which would have been enforced at the
ancient common law; it in no way restricted alienation or use of the
land. Some thirty years later the court handed down its great opinion
in Mandlebaum 11. McDonell, 65 saying that a condition subsequent in
60 Williams, "The Doct:cine 0£ Repugnancy," 59 L.Q.
61 "Restraints," 50 lvf:rcm:. L. R.Ev. 1033-1037 (1952).
62 SCRtrITON, LAND IN FETI'l!BS 140-159 (1886).

R.Ev. 343 at 350 (1943).

as "Restraints," 50 lvf:rcm:. L. REv. 704-705 (1952).
64Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, l Dougl. 225 (Mich. 1844);, Michigan State
Bank v. Hammond, 1 Dougl. 527 (Mich. 1845). In the latter case the court.ruled that,
if the grantor would waive the forfeiture, a decree would enter requiring the grantee to
hold the land upon constructive trust to the extent necessazy to indemnify the grantor. Cr.
Waldron v. Toledo, .Ann .Arbor & G.T.R. Co., 55 Mich. 420, 21 N.W. 870 (1885), assuming the validity or a condition subsequent requiring the grantee or a right or way to erect
a side track within eight months.
06 29 Mich. 78, 18 Am. Rep. 61 (1874), "Restraints," 50 lvf:rcm:. L. R.Ev. 707, note
138 (1952).
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a devise in fee simple, restraining all alienation for a limited time,
was repugnant to the grant and "l[oid because it tended to deprive the
estate of an inseparable incident and because there can be no remainder or .reversion following a fee simple to which the benefit of such
a restraint can be annexed.66
Defeasance as a device for imposing use restrictions was first
considered here in Barrie v. Smith. 67 In 1879 the plaintiffs conveyed
a village lot in fee simple, subject to a condition subsequent, with express right of re-entry, against sale of intoxicating liquor. The defendant, a subsequent purchaser of the lot, used it for the operation of a
saloon. A judgment for the plaintiffs, enforcing the forfeiture, was
reversed on the ground that the plaintiffs had not shown that observance of the condition would be of substantial benefit or that its
breach worked an actual substantial injury to them, and so had failed
to prove that the condition was not avoided by a Michigan statute
providing,
"When any conditions annexed to a grant or conveyance of
lands are merely nominal, and evince no intention of actual and
substantial benefit to the party to whom or in whose favor they
are to be performed, they may be wholly disregarded, and a failure
to perform the same shall in no case operate as a forfeiture of the
lands conveyed subject thereto." 68 .
On a second trial the plaintiffs proved that, at the time of the deed,
they had owned a mill and a store in the village, that they still owned
some interest in them, and that the performance of the condition
tended to ensure the sopriety of employees of these establishments. A
judgment for the defendant, entered on a directed verdict, was reversed in Smith v. Barrie.69 The Michigan Supreme Court, in an
66 29
67 47

Mich. 78 at 91-107, "Restraints," 50 MICH. L. Rlw. 708, note 139 (1952).
Mich. 130, 10 N.W. 168 (1881), "Restraints," 50 MxcH. L. Rlw. 709, note
142 (1952).
.
6S Rev. Stat. (1846), c. 62, §46; Comp. Laws (1857) §2630; Comp. Laws (1871)
§4113; Comp. Laws (1897) §8828; How. Stat. §5562; Comp. Laws (1915) §11654; Comp.
Laws (1929) §12966; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.46; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.46. The
decision, in effect, creates a rebuttable presumption that conditions are avoided by the
statute. Minnesota and Wisconsin have similar statutes. Minn. Stat. (1945) §500.20;
Wis. Stat. (1949) §230.46. In the former there appears to be a rebuttable presumption
that conditions are not avoided by the statute. Sioux City & St. P. R.R. v. Singer, 49 Minn.
301, 51 N.W. 905 (1892). In Abraham v. Stewart, 83 Mich. 7 at 10, 46 N.W. 1030
(1890), it was said that the benefit must continue to the time of breach. In Johnson v.
Warren, 74 Mich. 491, 42 N.W. 74 (1889), it was held that the statute has no application
to conditions in wills.
69 56 Mich. 314, 22 N.W. 816 (1885). In Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 24
N.W. 104 (1885), an injunction against breach of a similar condition was granted at the
suit of a purchaser from the granter. Both the granter and the _plaintiff owned saloons and
the benefit. of the condition to them was elimination of competition. But in Chippewa
Lumber Co. v. Tremper, 75 Mich. 36, 42 N.W. 532 (1889), it was said that such a
condition was in violation of public policy if :imposed to protect a monopoly.

520

MrcmGAN L.{\.w REvmw

[ Vol. 52

opinion by Chief Justice Cooley, brushed aside the contention that the
condition was repugnant to the grant, suggested that conditions could
be used to impose restrictions as to building lines, character, height or
size of buildings, and types of use, and said that conditions are valid
unless they are against public policy. This "public policy" the opinion
identified with that which governs the legality of contracts.
By the decision in Smith 11. Barrie Michigan saddled itself with
the baneful doctrine, wrong in principle and evil in its results, that
defeasance is a proper device for imposing use restrictions. Since then,
much judicial effort has. been devoted to limiting the doctrine and
trying to prevent its unhappy consequences. The doctrine has been
limited by decisions refusing to construe the language of conveyances
as providing for defeasance70 or holding that the event upon which
the defeasance is to be operative is too indefinite for enforcement.71
Enforcement has been refused unless the breach is substantial and continued for an extended period.72 Notice to the violator of the exact
breach claimed and a reasonable opportunity to terminate the proscribed use has been made a prerequisite to enforcement.73 Waiver of
the breach and estoppel to assert a forfeiture have been readily found. 74
70 People v. Beaubien, 2 Dougl. 256 (Mich. 1846); Hathaway v. Village of New
Baltimore, 48 Mich. 251, 12 N.W. 186 (1882); Adams v. Fh:st Baptist Church of St.
Charles, 148 Mich. 140, 111 N.W. 757 (1907); Quinn v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 256
Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 (1931); Briggs v. Grand Rapids, 261 Mich. 11, 245 N.W.
555 (1932); Clark v. Grand Rapids, 334 Mich. 646, 55 N.W. (2d) 137 (1952). But
see Blanchard v. Detroit, Lansing & Lake Michigan Railroad Co., 31 Mich. 43 (1875);
Epworth Assem'bly v. Ludington & Northern Railway, 236 Mich. 565, 211 N.W. 99
(1926). The reluctance to interpret language as imposing forfeiture evidenced in these
decisions stands in striking contrast to the readiness displayed in suits to enforce equitable
servitudes to fuid a manifestation of intention to impose use restrictions. In De Conick v.
De Conick, 154 Mich. 187, 117 N.W. 570 (1908), a conveyance upon condition subsequent was delivered in escrow for delivery to the grantee at the grantor's death.· It was
held that a 'breach of the condition occurring 'before the grantor's death did not work a
forfeiture 'because the condition was not operative until the second delivery.
71 Howlett v. Howlett, 115 Mich. 75, 72 N.W. 1100 (1897).
'l2 Lemmen v. Allendale Grange No. 421, 201 Mich. 179, 166 N.W. 1003 (1918);
Ford v. Detroit, 273 Mich. 449, 263 N.W. 425 (1935); Central Land Co. v. Grand
Rapids, 302 Mich. 105, 4 N.W. (2d) 485. (1942); Clark v. Grand Rapids, 334 Mich.
646, 55 N.W. (2d) 137 (1952). The deed involved in Central Land Co. v. Grand Rapids
gave the plaintiff a right of entry if any part of the land was 11Sed for any pmpose except
park, highway, street or 'boulevard. The grantee was drilling for oil and proposed to
continue doing so for two more years. It was held that there was no substantial 'breach or
condition. See Rhines v. Consumers' Power Co., 259 Mich. 236, 242 N.W. 898 (1932).
'l3Weber v. Ford Motor Co., 245 Mich. 213, 222 N.W. 198 (1928). Citing Treat
v. Detroit United ~way, 157 Mich. 320, 122 N.W. 93 (1909), a case involving an
executory land contract.
74 Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Tremper, 75 Mich. 36, 42 N.W. 532 (1889); Weber
v. Ford Motor Co., note 73 supra. In Hatch v. Village' of St. Joseph, 68 Mich. 220, 36
N.W. 36 (1888), land was conveyed in fee simple subject to a condition subsequent requiring that it be developed as a park within ten years and maintained as such forever.
Devisees of the grantor, alleging that he and they had been in possession since the convey•
ance, 'brought a 'bill to quiet title some filty years later. Relief was denied on the ground
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Such decisions are, of course, only palliatives; they do not prevent a
grantor who has skilled legal advice from imposing severe restrictions
on use, which operate as serious indirect restraints on alienation, by
means of provisions for defeasance. Moreover, such decisions, by making it difficult to determine the enforceability of provisions for defeasance, make many titles doubtful and a questionable title is in itself an
indirect restraint on alienation of considerable magnitude.
In their effort to limit the evil of defeasance as a device for imposing use restrictions, the courts returned to ancient common law
precedents75 and established a rule that rights of entry on breach of
condition and possibilities of reverter, created in conveyances in fee
simple, are inalienable inter vivos76 and incapable of being devised
by \vilJ.77 and that an attempt to alienate a right of entry inter vivos
destroys it.78 This rule has had the effect of wiping out some of the
old provisions for defeasance which encumber titles but it adds to the
evils occasioned by the provisions which it does not destroy. For one
thing, it tends to preserve the worst provisions for defeasance and
destroy those which are least objectionable. For example, if Andrew
Baker, owning Whiteacre and Blackacre, conveys the latter to John
Stiles and his heirs with a condition providing for forfeiture if any
oE laches. Act 200, P.A. 1945, Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.1271 to 26.1279; Comp. Laws
(1948) §§565.101 to 565.109, probably extinguishes provisions for defeasance not mentioned in any document recorded within forty years. Aigler, "Clearance of Land TitlesA Statutory Step," 44 M:r01r. L. Imv. 45 at 53 (1945); Basye, "Streamlining Conveyancing
Procedure," 47 M:rcH. L. Imv. 1097 at 1121 (1949).
75 It is clear that the common law did not permit alienation oE a :right oE entry, at
least prior to breach oE the condition. 1 CoXB, !NsnTtIT.ES "'214a (1628). It does not
appear that an attempt to alienate it destroyed the :right oE entry at common law but the
Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, §1 (1540), provided that it should. Partridge v. Strange, l
Plowden 77, 75 Eng. Rep. 123 at 140 (1552); Sir Moyle Finch's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 63a,
77 Eng. Rep. 348 at 362 (1606); Goodright ex dem. Fowler v. Forrester, 8 East 552, 103
Eng, Rep. 454 (1809). See Bruckner's Lessee v. Lawrence, l Dougl. 19 (Mich. 1843).
Sir Edward Coke seems to have thought that a possibility oE reverter upon expiration oE a
fee conveyed subject to a special limitation was alienable but, it not being certain that such
an interest could exist at common law, this point is equally uncertain. 1 CoXB, INsnnrrns
"'214b (1628); note 4 supra.
76 Right oE entry: Halpin v. Rural Agricultural School District No. 9, 224 Mich. 308,
194 N.W. 1005 (1923); County oE Oakland v. Mack, 243 Mich. 279, 220 N.W. 801
(1928); Quinn v. Pere Marquette Railway Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 (1931);
Avery v. Consumers' Power Co., 265 Mich. 696, 253 N.W. 189 (1934); Dolby v. State
Highway Commissioner, 283 Mich. 609, 278 N.W. 694 (1938); JuiE v. State Highway
Commissioner, 287 Mich. 35, 282 N.W. 892 (1938). PosSI"bility oE reverter: Fractional
School District No. 9 v. Beardslee, 248 Mich. 112, 226 N.W. 867 (1929).
11 Puffer v. Clark, 202 Mich. 169, 168 N.W. 471 (1918). CE. Hatch v. Village oE
St. Joseph, 68 Mich. 220, 36 N.W. 36 (1888).
78 Halpin v. Rural Agricultural School District No. 9, County oE Oakland v. Mack,
Avery v. Consumers' Power Co., Dolby v. State Highway Commissioner, JuiE v. State
Highway Commissioner, note 76 supra. CE. note 75 supra.
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building over thirteen feet high is ever erected on Blackacre,79 it is
improbable that this onerous restriction will ever be destroyed by an
. attempt on the part of Baker or his heirs to transfer the right of entry.
If, on the other hand, John Stiles, owning Blackacre, conveys a narrow
strip across his farm to a railroad, with a condition subsequent operative
upon cessation of railroad use, and a comer of the farm to a school
district "so long as used for a public school," a subsequent conveyance
of Blackacre as a whole is quite probable and will destroy the right of
entry unless the land subject to it is expressly excluded from the conveyance. Moreover, in the railroad and school cases, the reverter, if any,
should be to the owner of Blackacre rather than to Stiles or his heirs.
If it cannot be made to pass with a conveyance of Blackacre, that farm
is worth more in the hands of Stiles and his heirs than in those of a
purchaser and the rule of inalienability acts as an indirect restraint on
the alienation of the whole farm.
The rule that rights of entry and possibilities of reverter are inalienable and cannot be devised tends to make their elimination much more
difficult in this country than in sixteenth century England. Under the
rule of primogeniture the heir of a grantor who had conveyed on
condition subsequent was almost always a single individual, readily
ascertainable, who could release the right of entry to the owner of
the burdened land. Under our statutes of descent, the heirs of the
grantor are likely to be very numerous after several generations. No
effective release can be secured without locating and securing the
joinder of all of them.80 In sum, the rule that rights of entry and
possibilities of reverter are inalienable, adopted in an effort to alleviate
the evil effects of provisions for defeasance used to impose use restrictions, probably aggravates those evil effects.
A Michigan statute, enacted in 1931, provides,
"The reversionary interest in lands conveyed on a condition
subsequent may be granted, conveyed, transferred or devised by
the owner of such interest, and by the subsequent grantees or
devisees thereof, either before or after the right of re-entry becomes effective: Provided, That this act shall not affect any such
interest created before it takes effect."81
79 LEA.cm, CASES AND MA.TEB.IAI.S ON Fannm !NrnnESTs, 2d. ed., 50, note 25 (1940),
states that such a condition, nnposed originally to enable the granter to watch his cattle
grazing, still encumbers the title to land in a closely built upon section of Boston.
so In Puffer v. Clark, note 77 supra, it was suggested, but not decided, that the heirs
of the grantor are to be determined at the time of the breach of condition rather than at
his death. If this is so, the owner of the burdened estate may never know when he has
secured releases from the right "heirs."
8 1 Act 219, P.A. 1931; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.851; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.111,
effective September 18, 1931.
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This statute does not affect the inalienability of a right of entry·
on breach of a condition subsequent contained in a conveyance executed before September 18, 1931,82 and it does not appear to extend
to possibilities of reverter.
Apart from the railroad and timber cases, which require special
consideration, the writer has found only one Michigan case in which,
under the doctrine of Smith 11. Barrie,83 a provision for defeasance
imposing use restrictions, in a conveyance in fee simple to a grantee
who was not a public or charitable corporation, has actually been
enforced. Estes 11. Muskegon County Agricultural & Driving Park
Association84 was an action of ejectment. In 1875 the plaintiff and his
wif~ conveyed the land to the defendant by a deed providing that it
should "be used for the purposes of fair grounds and driving park
and for no other purpose, and to revert to said first parties, their heirs
and assigns when abandoned by said second party for the purpose aforesaid." The permitted use was discontinued in 1902, the plaintiff demanded possession in 1910, and he commenced the action in 1911.
He having died before trial, a judgment in favor of his heirs was
affirmed. The doctrine of Smith 11. Barrie has been a potent source of
litigation, but there is no indication in the cases that it has ever, in even
a single instance, served its ostensible purpose of permitting the creation
of desirable residential districts.
It will be recalled that, under the English common law, a condition subsequent requiring removal within a limited time, in an otherwise outright conveyance of standing timber, was void as repugnant
to the grant.85 In Michigan such a condition is valid and the right
of entry on breach of it is alienable with the Iand.86 These special
rules as to timber are inconsistent both with the common law and with
the Michigan rules as to alienability of rights of entry. They do have
some justification in public policy, as the enforcement of such a condition in a sale of timber tends to free the land itself from an encums2 nolby v. State Highway Commissioner, 283 Mich. 609, 278 N.W. 694 (1938).
88 Note 69 supra.
84181 Mich. 71, 147 N.W. 553 (1914). Cf. note 74 supra. In McClanahan Oil
Co. v. Perkins, 303 Mich. 448, 6 N.W. (2d) 742 (1942), a gas lease for five years and as
long thereafter as gas "is or can be produced" was treated as valid but the special limitation
had not expired.
85Note 16 supra.
80 Haskell v. Ayres, 32 Mich. 93 (1875); Utley v. S. N. Wilcox Lumber Co., 59
Mich. 263, 26 N.W. 488 (1886); Williams v. Flood, 63 Mich. 487, 30 N.W. 93 (1886);
Gamble v. Gates, 92 Mich. 510, 52 N.W. 941 (1892); Macomber v. Detroit:, Lansing &
Northern R.R. Co., 108 Mich. 491, 66 N.W. 376 (1896); Harrington v. KneelandBigelow Co., 213 Mich. 327, 182 N.W. 68 (1921); Broadwell v. Walker, 216 Mich. 210,
184 N.W. 866 (1921). Cf. Monroe v. Bowen, 26 Mich. 523 (1873); Richards v. Tozer,
27 Mich. 451 (1873); Johnson v. Moore, 28 Mich. 3 (1873); Haskell v. Ayres, 35 Mich.
89 (1876).
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brance and there are certainly advantages to reuniting the title to the
timber with that to the land. Moreover, the same effect could be obtained under the English law by a conveyance of a profit in gross for
a limited term and there are disadvantages to thwarting an unobjectionable purpose because not expressed in appropriate technical language.
Since 1855 the general statutes governing incorporation of railroads have provided that land donated to a railroad shall be held and
used for the purposes of the grant only.87 Earlier special acts incorporating railroads did not contain similar provisions.88 Since 1887 the
statutes have provided that when a railroad track ceases to be used, the
railroad must convey donated lands ''to the person, persons, or corporation from whom it was received, or to his or its heirs, assigns, executors,
administrators, or successors."89 It thus appears that the use of land
donated to railroads is restricted by statute and breach of the statutory
restriction entails forfeiture. As has been seen, at the English common
law, a condition subsequent restraining a type of alfenation or use
which would be wr<;mgful in the absence of the condition is not renugnant to the grant.00 flence it would seem, upon principle, that a cotdition subsequent entitling the grantor to enter upon cessation of use
for railroad purposes should be valid in a.,donatilze. conveyance executed
after 1855 but not in a conveyance in fee simple given for a valuable
consideration. Such conditions have been enforced whether the conveyance was by way of sale91 or by way of gift92 and the judicial
opinions involving them make no distinction between the two.93
8'1 Act 82, P.A. 1855, §17, 112; Act 198, 1873, §9, 112; How. Stat. §3323; Comp. Laws
(1897) §6234; Comp. Laws (1915) §8243; Comp. Laws (1929) §11121; Mich. Stat.
Ann., §22.212; Comp. Laws (1948) §464.9.
SBSpecial acts of incorporation were prohibited by CoNST. 1850, art. 15, §1, and
CoNST. 1908, art. XII, §l. Special acts incorporating railroads tended to provide that title
acquired by condemnation should be on special limitation, "so long as used for railroad
purposes," but did not limit the title acquired by gift or purchase. Act 109, 1837, §12; Act
111, 1837, §12; Act 118, 1837, §12; Act 12, 1837 Ext. Sess., §12; Act 74, 1838, §12; Act
84, 1838, §12; Act 94, 1838, §12; Act 96, 1838, §12; Act 42, 1846, §7; Act 98, 1846,
§11; Act 104, 1846, §10; Act 113, 1846, §8; Act 137, 1846, §12; Act 154, 1846, §11; Act
5, 1847, §15; Act 152, 1848, §10; Act 199, 1848, §15; Act 234, 1848, §15; Act 274,
1850, §15. Some of the xailroads were built by the state on land acquired by it and later
sold to private corporations. E.g., Act 42, 1846 (Michigan Central Rail Road); Act 113,
1846 (Michigan Southern Rail Road).
89 Act 275, 1887; How. Stat. §3457a; Comp. Laws (1897) §6347; Comp. Laws
(1915) §8363; Comp. Laws (1929) §11353; Mich. Stat. Ann. §22.591; Comp. Laws
(1948) §469.221. The language of the statute appears to extend to gifts made before its
enactment. CoNST. 1850, art. 15, §12, and CoNST. 1908, art. XII, §5, prohibit retention
by a corporation for more than ten years of land not actually occupied in the exercise of
its franchises.
90 "Restraints," 50 MiCH. L. REv. 731, notes 217, 218 (1952); notes 20, 22 supra.
,
91 Hickox v. Chicago & Canada Southern Railway Co., 78 Mich. 615, 44 N.W. 143
(1889).
i 92 Hawkins v. Dillman, 268 Mich. 483, 256 N.W. 492 (1934).
93 Notes 91, 92 supra, 94 infra; Detroit v. Detroit & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 23 Mich.
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If forfeiture is justifiable in such cases it should be to the owner
of the contiguous land. The 1887 act appears to recognize this by
requiring conveyance to the "assigns" of the original grantor. As to
conditions subsequent, restricting to railroad use, in conveyances made
before 1931, however, the right of entry has been held to be inalienable
and destroyed by an attempt at transfer.94 The result of this rule
is most unhappy. Suppose Andrew Baker conveyed a strip through
his farm, Blackacre, to a railroad in 1930, subject to a condition subsequent operative on cessation of railroad use. In 1954 it is apparent
that, because of competition of truck lines, the railroad will soon be
abandoned. John Stiles wishes to purchase Blackacre and, naturaily,
to get the strip now used by the railroad if that use ceases. If Andrew
sells Blackacre to him without excepting the right of entry, the right
,vill be destroyed and the reunion of the strip vvith the farm prevented.
If Andrew sells, excepting the right of entry, it will be Andrew or his
heirs who will have the right of entry when railroad use ceases, again
preventing reunion of the strip with the farm.
Mahar v. Grand Rapids Terminal Railway Co.95 was a suit to
remove a cloud from title. In I 901 Russell and Boltwood granted.
a right of way for railroad purposes, 50 feet wide, over land owned
by them to Buttars, trustee for a railroad, the deed providing that if a
railroad should not be erected within three years or if such railroad
should not be operated for a year, title should revert to the grantors,
their heirs or assigns. In 1902 Russell and Boltwood conveyed the
whole tract of land to the plaintiff, "excepting the conditional right of
way heretofore granted to the Ludington Railroad Company." The
condition was breached. A decree for the plaintiff was affirmed. The
opinion states that the 1901 grant conveyed only an easement, that the
fee subject to the easement was alienable, that its alienation did not
destroy the power of termination, and that the plaintiff, as purchaser
of the fee subject to the easement, was entitled to enforce the condition
subsequent. Such a grant would not have created an easement in
173 (1871); Treat v. Detroit United Railway, 157 lvlich. 320, 122 N.W. 93 (1909);
Epworth Assembly v. Ludington & Northern Railway, 236 lvlich. 565, 211 N.W. 99
(1926); Weber v. Ford Motor Co., 245 lvlich. 213, 222 N.W. 198 (1928); Rhines v.
Consumers' Power Co., 259 lvlich. 236, 242 N.W. 898 (1932). But see Quinn v. Pere
Marquette Railway Co., 256 l\fich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 (1931).

4'!,Quinn v. Pere Marquette Railway Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 (1931);
Avery v. Consumers Power Co., 265 lvlich. 696, 253 N.W. 189 (1934); Dolby v. State
Highway Commissioner, 283 Mich. 609, 278 N.W. 694 (1938); Juif v. State Highway
Commissioner, 287 lvlich. 35, 282 N.W. 892 (1938).
o:; 174 lvlich. 138, 140 N.W. 535 (1913). See Quinn v. Pere Marquette Railway
Co., 256 lvlich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 (1931). Cf. Badeaux v. Ryerson, 213 lvlich. 642,
182 N.W. 22 (1921).
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England because it conferred a right of exclusive possession, which is a
possessory estate, not a servitude. Assuming that the interest granted
in 1901 was an easement, the decision would be justifiable on principle
if the restriction were by special limitation. As it was by condition
subsequent, it is difficult to reconcile the case with those cited in the
preceding paragraph. Nevertheless, the result reached is much happier
than those which they effected.
It will be recalled that, under the English common law, a condition
subsequent restricting use was valid in a conveyance to a public or
charitable corporation, providing the conditional event was bound to
happen, if at all, within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.96
The common law Rule Against Perpetuities did not apply to conveyances of Michigan land made between 1847 and 1949.97 In 1942
the Michigan Supreme Court actually enforced a defeasance upon
expiration of a special limitation made in 1864 "so long as occupied
for school purposes."98 In a number of other cases it has assumed the
validity of conditions subsequent and special limitations restricting
land conveyed in fee to public or charitable uses, whether the conveyance was made before99 or after 1847,1° 0 without regard to the
duration of the restriction.
Village of Grosse Pointe Shores 11. Ayres 101 was a suit for a
96 Notes 26, 27 supra.
97Wincliate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926); ''Restraints," 50 MICH.
L. Rmr. 734, note 231 (1952).
98 Thomas v. Jewell, 300 Mich. 556, 2 N.W. (2d) 501 (1942).
99Thayer v. McGee, 20 Mich. 195 (1870) (conveyance to city for public square);
Hatch v. Village oE St. Joseph, 68 Mich. 220, 36 N.W. 36 (1888) (condition subsequent
in conveyance to city for public park); County oE Oakland v. Mack, 243 Mich. 279, 220
N.W. 801 (1928) (condition subsequent in conveyance to county for court house).
100 Hathaway v. Village oE New Baltimore, 48 Mich. 251, 12 N.W. 186 (1882)
(bequest to village for high school); School District No. 5 oE Delhi v. Everett, 52 Mich.
314, 17 N.W. 926 (1883) (special limitation in conveyance to school district); Adams v.
First Baptist Church oE St. Charles, 148 Mich. 140, Ill N.W. 757 (1907) (devise to
church for parsonage); Puffer v. Clark, 202 Mich. 169, 168 N.W. 471 (1918) (condition
subsequent in conveyance for home for retired clergymen); Halpin v. Rural Agricultural
School District No. 9, 224 Mich. 308, 194 N.W. 1005 (1923) (condition subsequent in
conveyance to school district); Trustees oE the M. J. Clark Memorial Home v. Jewell, 240
Mich. 250, 215 N.W. 378 (1927) (same conveyance involved in Puffer v. Clark); Fractional School District No. 9 v. Beardslee, 248 Mich. 112, 226 N.W. 867 (1929) (special
limitation in conveyance to school district); Bruce v. Henry Ford Hospital, 254 Mich. 394,
236 N.W. 813 (1931) (condition subsequent in conveyance to charitable hospital); Briggs
v. Grand Rapids, 261 Mich. 11, 245 N.W. 555 (1932) (conveyance to city for park);
Ford v. Detroit, 273 Mich. 449, 263 N.W. 425 (1935) (condition subsequent in conveyance to city for park between lanes oE a street); Central Land Co. v. Grand Rapids, 302
Mich. 105, 4 N.W. (2d) 485 (1942) (condition subsequent in conveyance to city for
park, highway, street or boulevard purposes); Clark v. Grand Rapids, 334 Mich. 646, 55
N.W. (2d) 137 (1952) (condition subsequent in conveyance to trustee for public park
purposes).
101254 Mich. 58, 235 N.W. 829 (1931). See Dickerson v. Detroit, 99 Mich. 498
at 501, 58 N.W. 645 (1894). CE. Leggett v. Detroit, 137 Mich. 247, 100 N.W. 566
(1904); Ford v. Detroit, note 100 supra.
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declaratory judgment. The defendants conveyed land to the plaintiff
village for highway purposes by a deed providing that there should
be two driveways with a parkway between and on each side and that
no sidewalk, sewer, water main or underground public utility conduit
should occupy the east parkway. The deed further provided that title
should revert to the grantors, their heirs, executors, administrators or
assigns upon breach of these restrictions. It was held that the restrictions were void as against public policy and repugnant to the grant
in that they were an attempt to oust municipal control of highways.
This decision may evidence some tendency to look again with respect
upon the ancient doctrine of repugnancy which was so readily brushed
aside in Smith v. Barrie.102
Since 1925 the statutes have provided,
"Whenever any lands shall heretofore or hereafter be conveyed by any grant or devise to be held or used for any religious,
educational, charitable, benevolent or public purpose, with a condition annexed in the instrument of conveyance that in event said
lands shall at any time cease to be held or used for the purpose
set forth in such conveyance, title thereto shall revert to the
grantor or devisor and his heirs, and . . . it shall appear to the
satisfaction of the court that . . . because of changed conditions
or circumstances since the execution of such conveyance it is impossible or impracticable to longer hold or use said lands for the
purposes limited in such conveyance and that the religious, educational, charitable, benevolent, or public object of the grantor,
as set forth in such conveyance, may be defeated thereby, a decree
may be entered authorizing the grantor [sic] to sell such lands
..., and clirecting that the proceeds of the sale of such lands shall
be reinvested in other lands suitable for the use or purpose set forth
in the original conveyance, which lands shall thereupon be held
by the grantee named in the original conveyance subject to the
same limitations as set forth therein.
.
"No sale of lands under the decree of the court as herein
provided shall defeat the estate of the grantee named in the original conveyance because of the failure to longer hold or use the
same for the purpose named in such conveyance and shall be
sufficient to convey to the purchaser of such lands a good and
sufficient title in fee simple, free from all conditions or limitations whatsoever, under which the same shall theretofore have
been held or used."103
102 56 Mich. 314, 22 N.W. 816 (1885), note 69 supra.
103Act 258, P.A. 1925; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13518 to 13521; Mich. Stat. Ann
§§26.1211 to 26.1214; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.401 to 554.404; also discussed in "Restraints," 50 Mica. L. Rnv. 733 (1952).
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The statute prohibits action under it within ten years from the
execution of the conveyance on condition or in the lifetime of the
grantor.104 The provision that the proceeds of the statutory sale shall
be invested in other lands which will then be subject to the provision for defeasance of the original conveyance, may have peculiar
results. For example, if a farmer conveys a comer of his farm to a
school district, subject to a condition restricting it to school use, the
consolidated school movement may result in the farmer's son acquiring
a right of entry in the site of some consolidated school twenty miles
away, instead of getting the comer of the farm back when it is no
longer used for a school. Conveyances for highway or sewer purposes
may cause similar peculiar results. Probably the statute applies to
special limitations as well as to conditions subsequent. It does not
apply to conditional limitations of shifting executory interests. However, as has been seen, a shifting executory interest, unless to another
charity, must comply with the Rule Against_ Perpetuities.
Whatever its demerits, the statute is a partial legislative recognition of the fact that defeasance is no. longer an appropriate method
of enforcing the terms of public and charitable gifts. Michigan
refused to enforce charitable trusts until they were authorized by
statute in 1907.105 Consequently, prior to 1907, defeasance was the
only available device for ensuring that a public or charitable donation
was used for the intended purpose. Now that charitable trusts are
valid and enforceable at the suit of the attorney general, enforcement
by defeasance is rarely desirable. Private enforcement of charitable
gifts, like qui-tam actions and private criminal prosecutions, is a relic
of a period when executive government was too weak or too inefficient
to enforce public rights. Public rights should be enforced by public
authority, not by.private persons motivated by whim or avarice.
As has been seen, the American doctrine that defeasance may be
used as a device for imposing use restrictions on land conveyed in
fee simple to private persons, arose at a time when the growth of
industry and cities seemed to demand some method of excluding
obnoxious activities from residential districts and no better device was
104Sec. 2.
10s Methodist

Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 3 N.W. 207
(1879); Wheelock v. American Tract Society, 109 Mich. 141, 66 N.W. 955 (1896);
Hopkins v. Crossley, 132 Mich. 612, 96 N.W. 499 (1903); Gilchrist v. Corliss, 155 Mich.
126, 118 N.W. 938 (1908); McPherson v. Byrne, 155 Mich. 338, 118 N.W. 985 (1909);
Stoepel v. Satterthwaite, 162 Mich. 457, 127 N.W. 673 (1910). Charitable trusts were
authorized by Act 122, P.A. 1907, superseded by Act 280, P.A. 1915, Comp. Laws (1915)
§11099; Comp. Laws (1929) §13512; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.1191; Comp. Laws (1948)
§554.351. Trusts for public welfare purposes were authorized by Act 373, P.A. 1925,
Comp. Laws (1929) §13517; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.1201; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.381.
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known to the bar. In the middle of the nineteenth century the English
courts invented a much more suitable device to accomplish the purpose,
the equitable servitude. It is more suitable because it does not involve
a forfeiture, if does not involve enforcement of use restrictions which
have become obsolete and worthless due to change of circumstances,
enforcement does not destroy the restrictions, and the benefit of the
restrictions is appurtenant to the land protected by the restrictions.
The equitable servitude use restriction has been developed elaborately
by the courts of Michigan. The doctrine that defeasance is a usable
mode of imposing use restrictions on privately owned land is in
conflict with the principles of the common law, works harsh, inequitable results, and is no longer useful. Michigan would do well
to abolish it by overruling Smith v. Barrie106 and the one decision
following it.107 Refusal to enforce provisions for defeasance as such
would not prevent the enforcement as equitable servitudes of the
restrictions on use intended to be imposed by such provisions.108
Estates for Life and for Years

Estates for life and for years differ from estates in fee simple
in that there is always a remainder or reversion which will become
possessory upon their expiration. The remaindennan or reversioner has
a very real interest in the character of the tenant in possession and
in the type of use which he makes of the land. This interest in the
character of the tenant is recognized in the rules which permit penalty
restraints on alienation of estates for life and years, even though they
restrain all alienation.109 The interest of the remaindennan or reversioner in the type of use made of the land had explicit statutory
recognition at an early date. The Statute of Marlebridge forbade
tennors to commit waste without special license and subjected them
to liability in damages for doing so.110 The Statute of Gloucester
provided that a tenant for life or years who committed waste should
100 Note 102 supra.
107Estes v. Muskegon County Agricultural & Driving Park Assn., 181 Mich. 71, 147
N.W. 553 (1914).
10s watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 24 N.W. 104 (1885), note 69 supra.
109 ''Restraints," 50 MrCH. L. R:Ev. 795-796, 808-809 (1952).
110 52 Hen. m, c. 23, §2 (1267): "Also Fermors, during their Terms, shall not make
Waste, Sale, nor Exile oE Houses, Woods, Men, nor oE any Thing belonging to the Tenements that they have to ferm, without SPecial Licence had by writing of Covenant, making
mention that they may do it; which thing iE they do, and thereof be convict, they shall
yield £ull Damage, and shall be punished by Amerciament grievously." "Fermors" included
all lessees for life or years. 2 Co:im, INsnnr.rns 145 (1641).
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pay triple damages and forfeit the place wasted.111 The term wa~te
included not only destructive activities which injured the reversion or
remainder, such as destroying buildings, cutting timber or opening
mines, but also failure to maintain or repair the premises and any
substantial change in their existing appearance or use. It was waste
to convert arable land to timber or vice versa, to enlarge a house, or
to change the location of fences. In short, the tenant for life or years
might continue to use the land in the precise manner in which it was
used when his tenancy began but might not make any change in the
use without express license.112 So far as use is concerned, such an
estate had very little in the way of essential incidents.
As in the case of conveyances in fee simple, a provision for defeasance in a lease for life or years which operated to deprive the estate
demised of an essential incident, was void as repugnant to the grant.
Thus a condition subsequent in a lease for life that the tenant, or some
of the tenants, should not occupy the Iand118 or should not take the
profits114 was repugnant and void, even though .the restriction was
limited in duration to something less than the full term of the lease.
Likewise, a condition in a lease for years restraining the lessee from
occupying the premises during part of the term116 or denying him the
use of part of the demised premises,116 was invalid. Apart from these
extreme provisions, penalizing any use whatever, however, the English
courts have enforced provisions for defeasance in leases for life and
years, which impose use restrictions. Thus conditions subsequent in
leases for years restraining the lessee from committing waste117 or
cutting timber,118 requiring him to keep the premises in repair,119
restricting use of the premises to a particular type of business,1 20
restricting against a particular type of business,1 21 or restraining use
111 6 Edw. I, c. 5 (1278). Tenants in aower, by the curtesy and in guardianship were
punishable for waste at common law. These statutes extended such liability to ordinaty
tenants for life and years but left the definition of waste to the common law. 2 CoXB,
!NSTlTl'.lTBs 299-301 (1641).
·
112 1 Cox:s, lNSTITaTEs *52b-54b (1628).
11a Scovel v. Cabe!, Cro. Eliz. 89, pL 13, 107, pl. I, 78 Eng. Rep. 347 at 365 (1589).
114 Plesington's Case, Bellewe 284, 72 Eng. Rep. 124 at 125 (1382); Moore v. Savil,
2 Leonard 132, pl. 176, 74 Eng. Rep. 419 (1585).
115 See Moore v. Savil, note 114 supra; Scovel v. Cabel, note 113 supra. Cf. Vincent
Lee's Case, 3 Leonard 110, 74 Eng. Rep. 573 (1584).
116 See Stukeley v. Butler, Hobart 168, 80 Eng. Rep. 316 at 317 (1614). Cf.
Homeby v. Clifton, 3 Dyer 264b, 73 Eng. Rep. 586 (1567); Welcden v. Elkington, 2
Plowden 516, 75 Eng. Rep. 763 at 775 (1578).
117 Abbot of Shirbume's Case, Y.B. 12 Hen. IV, Mich., pl. 11 (1410).
118 Anonymous, Moore K.B. 49, pl. 149, 72 Eng. Rep. 433, Dal. 49, pl. 12, 123 Eng.
Rep. 263 (1563).
119 Penton v. Barnett, [1898] 1 Q.B. 276.
120Timms v. Baker, 49 L.T. 106 (Q.B. Div. 1883) (wine, spirit or ale merchant).
121 Toleman v. Portbury, L.R. 5 Q.B. 288 (1870) (auctions).
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for any business not approved by the lessor,1 22 have been treated as
valid. Such proscribed uses are probably within the broad common law
definition of waste. The English courts have also treated as valid
provisions for defeasance, in leases for life or years, if the lessee fails
to reside upon the demised land.123 As failing to live on the land was
not waste at common law, these last decisions must indicate that while,
ordinarily, a tenant for life or years is free to reside where he chooses,
such a restriction does not deprive the estate of an essential, inseparable
incident. This suggests that, for purposes of applying the doctrine of
repugnancy, these lesser estates are looked upon as having virtually
no essential incidents of use except that of some kind of use. In this
connection it will be recalled that, in the thirteenth century, a lease
for years did not create an estate in Ian~ at all but only a license to
use, based upon conract, and strictly limited to the privileges expressly
conferred.124
One of the reasons why defeasance in favor of the grantor is not
a suitable device for imposing use restrictions in a conveyance in fee
simple is that rights of entry and possibilities of reverter are personal
interests which cannot be conveyed with or made appurtenant to the
land benefited by the restrictions. In the case of a lease for life or
years on special limitation (e.g., "to Jane Stiles so long as she remains a
widow and makes her home upon the demised land"; "to John Stiles
for twenty years if he shall so long dwell upon the demised land,")
the interest retained by the lessor is not a mere possibility of reverter
but a reversion, which is an estate in the land and freely alienable.125
Restrictions in a lease enure to the benefit of the reversion and the
o,vner of the reversion is entitled to take possession when an estate for
life or years expires by special limitation. A right of entry on breach
of a condition subsequent in a lease for life, however, is not part of
the reversion. At common law such a right of entry was personal to
the lessor and could only be exercised by him, even after he had conveyed the reversion to another and so no longer had any interest
in the demised land.126 This rule was changed by a statute of 1540
122Doe ex dem. Bish v. Keeling, 1 M. & S. 95, 105 Eng. Rep. 36 (1813).
Case, 1 Dyer 77a, 73 Eng. Rep. 169 (1553) (condition subsequent
in lease for years); Doe ex dem. Lockwood v. Clarke, 8 East 185, 103 Eng. Rep. 313
(1807) (special limitation in lease for years); Wynne v. Fletcher, 24 Beav. 430, 53 Eng.
Rep. 423 (1857) (executozy devise on devise of life estate); 1 CoKB, !Nsnxarn,; *204a
(1628).
124 "Restxaints," 50 MxcH. L. REv. 807, note 286 (1952). Cf. Statute of Marlebridge,
52 Hen. ill, c. 23, §2 (1267), note 110 supra.
1251 CoKB, !NST1TOTEs *214h (1628); 1 CRmsB, REAL PROPERTY, 1st Amer. ed.,
title XIlI, §65 (1808).
126 Anonymous, Y.B. 11 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 14 (1495); 1 CoKB, !Nsnnrr.as *214b•
215a (1628). These authorities state that where a lease for years provided that it would
123 Chickeley's
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which empowered grantees of the reversion to enforce conditions subsequent in leases for life or years.127
Leases differ from conveyances in fee in another respect. As a
purchaser in fee usually pays the whole value of the land at the time
of his purchase, forfeiture of his estate is a very harsh and severe
penalty for breach of a use restriction. Lessees, on the other· hand,
usually pay rent on a monthly or annual basis, the rental payments
made in any period approximating the use value of the land for that
period. If the lessor elects to enforce a condition subsequent, the
lessee forfeits his estate but he is relieved from further payment of
rent. Hence, ordinarily forfeiture of a lease is not so severe a penalty
as that of an estate in fee in that it does not deprive the tenant of
that for which he has already paid or unjustly enrich the lessor. The
early cases showed as much reluctance to find a provision for forfeiture
in a lease as in a conveyance in fee.128 It came to be recognized, however, that, because the right of enforcement is appurtenant to the
reversion and because forfeiture is not usually so severe a penalty,
defeasance in favor of the lessor is not so unsuitable a method of
imposing use restrictions in a lease as in a conveyance in fee. Hence,
modem cases do not tend to distort the language of a lease in order
to avoid finding a condition subsequent.129
The Michigan Revised Statutes of 1838 provided that any tenant
for life or years who committed or suffered waste should forfeit his
estate and pay single damages.130 The Revised Statutes of 1846
eliminated the provision for forfeiture but imposed liability for double
damages for waste.131 The English statute of 1540 has not been
reenacted here but, nevertheless, it would seem that a right of entry
on breach of condition subsequent is appurtenant to the reversion and
exercisable by a purchaser of the reversion, whether the estate subject to
be void upon the happening of. an event, it terminated automatically when the event
happened, so that an assignee of the revexsion could take advantage of the forfeiture.
127 32 Hen. VIlI, c. 34, §1 (1540). See Winter's Case, 3 Dyer 308b, 73 Eng. Rep.
697 (1572), New York has a virtually identical statute. Real Property Law §223.
l2SE.g. Machel and Dunton's Case, 2 Leon. 33, 74 Eng. Rep. 335 (1587).
129 Goodtitle ex dem. Luxmore v. Saville, 16 East 87, 104 Eng. Rep. 1022 at 1025
(1812); 1 CoICS, !NsnTOT.Es *204a (1628).
130p, 496.
131 C. 110, §§1, 6; Comp. Laws (1857) §§4698, 4703; Comp. Laws (1871) §§6353,
6358; How. Stat. §§7940, 7945; Comp. Laws (1897) §§11116, 11121; Comp. Laws (1915)
§§14940, 14945; Comp. Laws (1929) §§15115, 15120; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§27.2141,
27.2146; Comp. Laws (1948) §§692.401, 692.406. Section I substantially reenacts the
Statute of Marlebridge, note 110 5\lpra.
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the condition is for life132 or years,133 even though the lease was
executed after the repeal of the English statutes in 1810 and before
the enactment in 1931 of the Michigan statute making rights of entry
alienable.134
It was so well settled in England that provisions for forfeiture designed to enforce use restrictions in leases for life or years are lawful
that the question of their validity has rarely been raised here. A special
limitation in a lease for life, requiring the lessee to occupy the land,
has been treated as valid.135 Provisions in leases for years requiring
the lessee personally to work the farm leased, on penalty of forfeiture,
have been enforced,136 as has a condition subsequent in a lease of an
apartment, entitling the lessor to reenter if a dog was kept on the
demised premises.137 The language of a number of opinions seems to
assume the validity of provisions for forfeiture on breach of covenants
in leases for years restricting use of the premises to farrning,138 to particular businesses139 or against sale of liquor.140 In Negaunee Iron
Company -v. Iron Cliffs Co.141 it was held that a provision in a 99-year
mining lease that the lessee should not mine ore "except such as it
shall actually convert into merchantable iron in its own furnaces or
forges," was a special limitation which caused the lease to expire when
the lessee ceased to. have a furnace in the vicinity.
It thus appears that, as to provisions for defeasance in leases for life
and years, the law of Michigan is the same as that of England: they
may be used to impose use restrictions. A provision for defeasance in
a lease for the life of a living person never violates the Rule Against
Perpetuities, but, in view of the brevity of human life, a restriction
132 Hamilton v. Wickson, 131 Mich. 71, 90 N.W. 1032 (1902); Hess v. Haas, 230
Mich. 646, 203 N.W. 471 (1925); 3 Sn.ms, LAw OF FtJTDRB hmmllsTs 162 (1936).
133 Patterson v. Carrel, 171 Mich. 296, 137 N.W. 158 (1912); Miller v. Pond, 214
Mich. 186, 183 N.W. 24 (1921).
134Act 219, P.A. 1931; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.851; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.111;
"Restraints," 50 MICH. L. Rnv. 830, note 374 (1952); note 81 sup:ra.
135 Larlverre v. Rains, 112 Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 583 (1897), discussed in ''Restraints,"
50 MICH. L. Rnv. 800-802 (1952). See Hess v. Haas, 230 Mich. 646, 203 N.W. 471
(1925).
13s Randall v. Chubb, 46 Mich. 311, 9 N.W. 429 (1881); Lewis v. Sheldon, 103
Mich. 102, 61 N.W. 269 (1894). Cf. Gravenburgh v. McKeough, 117 Mich. 555, 76
N.W. 77 (1898); Vincent v. Crane, 134 Mich. 700, 97 N.W. 34 (1903); Lowe v.
Radecke, 204 Mich. 646, 171 N.W. 408 (1919); McPheetexs v. Birkholz, 232 Mich. 370,
205 N.W. 196 (1925).
l37F.irst Mortgage Bond Co. v. Saxton, 312 Mich. 520, 20 N.W. (2d) 294 (1945).
138 Cronin v. Ochadleus, 308 Mich. 596, 14 N.W. (2d) 509 (1944).
139 Wertheimer v. Hosmer, 83 Mich. 56, 47 N.W. 47 (1890); Hilsendegen v. Hartz
Clothing Co., 165 Mich. 255, 130 N.W. 646 (1911).
140 Hammond v. Hibbler, 168 Mich. 66, 133 N.W. 932 (1911).
141134 Mich. 264, 96 N.W. 468 (1903); ''Restraints," 50 MICH. L. Iu.v. 816, note
323 (1952).
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in such a lease cannot endure for a very extended period. In the
mediaeval period, when the incidents of estates were becoming fixed
and the validity of provisions for defeasance determined, the estate
for years was a precarious interest because the owner of the fee could
destroy it by suffering a collusive common recovery.142 Consequently,
leases for long terms of years were virtually unknown. A statute of
1529 empowered tenants for years to hold their estates in spite of such
recoveries143 and so made estates for years much more valuable and
dependable interests. Leases for terms of five hundred and a thousand
years became common and it was suggested that a provision for defeasance upon the happening of an uncertain event, in such a long-term
lease, was subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. The courts had
considerable doubt about the question but eventually decided that,
when a vested reversion or remainder is expectant upon the expiration
of a term of years, the fact that the estate for years is defeasible upon
the occurrence of an event which may not happen within the period of
the Rule Against Perpetuities, does not invalidate the estate for years,
the reversion or remainder, or the provision for defeasance.144 Consequently, provisions for defeasance in leases for long terms of years may
be used to impose use restrictions which will continue for centuries,
regardless of the fact that changed conditions may make enforcement
of the restrictions undesirable. This possibility is a potential evil which
the legislature might well consider rectifying.145
1421 CoKE, lNSTITUTl!s 46a (1628). See Wind v. Jekyl, 1 P. Wms. 572, 24 Eng.
Rep. 522 at 523 (1719). The Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 11 (1278), 2 Cox:s,
lNSTrroTEs 321-324 (1641), empowered certain urban lessees to attack such collusive
recoveries.
14s 21 Hen. VllI, c. 15, §3 (1529).
144 Gore v. Gore, 2 P. Wms. 28, 24 Eng. Rep. 629 (1722); Wood v. Drew, 33 Beav.
610, 55 Eng. Rep. 505 (1864); Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 572, 2 N.W. 814
(1879); GRAY, RtJLE AGAINo:r P.BRPllTtllTIES, 3d ed., §209 (1915). Section 4 of the
Marketable Title Act, Act 200, P.A. 1945, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.1274; Comp. Laws
(1948) §565.104, excepts the interests of reversioners under leases from the provisions of
that act which extinguish interests not mentioned in any document recorded within forty
years.
145 CoNST. 1908, art. XVI, §10, limits ihe duration of leases or agricultu:tal land for
agricultural purposes, reserving rent or services, to twelve years. Compare ihe similar suggestion as to restraints on alienation in leases for long terms of years, ''Restraints," 50
:M':rCEr. L. Blw. 824-825 (1952). The problem is one for legislation because, unlike that
as to use restrictions on estates in fee, the courts have no historical precedents for overruling
their decisions.

